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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM

The Court of Appeals, citing 0Matter of Western Union Tel.
and Friedmanv. Handelman," unanimously declared it to be
New York policy that where the intention of the paxties was clearly and unambiguously expressed in a written agreement, effect
should be given to the intent as indicated by the language thereof
without adding to or subtracting from the stated rights and obligations.
This meant the above mentioned actions became proper after
five years, and, therefore, all territorial restrictions imposed by
the lower courts were abolished. The only limits which could be
were those set out in the agreement as not limited in
sustained
31
time.
00.29

Rehabilitation of Domestic Insurer
Section 511 (e) of the Insurance Law allows the superintendent of insurance to apply for rehabilitation if a domestic insurer
is found "to be in such condition that its further transaction of
business will be hazardous to its policy holders, or to its creditors,
32
or to the public." [italics added.] In Application of Bohlinger
the Supreme Court implied that "hazardous" meant any situation
which would render further transactions of business injurious to
policy holders, creditors or the public.33 Although the disposition
of the case remained the same, the Court of Appeals, facing such
"hazardous" encomproblem for the first time, made it clear3 that
4
passes only dangers financial in nature.
IIL

CIVm PRACTICE

Pre-trialDeposition
Section 288 of the Civil Practice Act authorizes the taking of.
a deposition of a party to an action, an original owner of a claim
not a party, and of any other person, as a witness, not a party
thereto, where it is material and necessary. The issue before the
Court of Appeals in a recent case' was whether the scope of the
words "any other person" includes officers or agents of the State.
29. 299 N. Y. 177, 86 N. E. 2d 162 (1949).
30. 300 N. Y. 188, 90 N. E. 2d 31 (1949).

31. Delancey Kosher Restaurant & Caterers Corp. v. Gluckstern, 305 N. Y. 250,

112 N. E. 2d 276 (1953).
32. 199 Misc. 941, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1951).

33. Id. at 968, 106 N. Y. S. 2d at 977-78, aff'd unanimously 280 App. Div. 517,

113 N. Y. S. 2d 755 (1st Dep't 1952).
34. 305 N. Y. 258, 112 N. E. 2d 280 (1953).
1. Buffalo v. Hanna Furnace Corp., 305 N. Y. 369, 113 N. E. 2d 520 (1953).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The City of Bu:ffalo brought an action for a declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that the defendant corporation was
required, under contracts with the city, to make alterations of a
bridge in connection with the construction of the Buffalo to
York Thruway. The corporation denied liability and movedNew
for
an order directing the taking of the deposition of the State Superintendent of Public Works, who was also Chairman of the New
York State Thruway Authority, as testimony material and necessary to its defense, under § 288. Neither the State nor the State
Superintendent were parties to the action. The Special Term's
denial of defendant's motion on the ground that there was no
statutory authority for taking such a deposition was affirmed by
the Appellate Division.
The Court of Appeals reversed this determination concluding
that the lower courts had the power to order the examination of
the State Superintendent before trial as a witness. The court
stressed the value of pre-trial examination, and noted the trend
in recent years, as evidenced by legislative and judicial pronouncement, toward extending and liberalizing the provisions for such
examinations.
The court rejected the argument of sovereign privilege, quoting that, "the testimonial duty to disclose knowledge needed in
judicial investigation is one that rests on all persons alike," 2 particularly, as here, where there is no showing that application of
the statute would seriously prejudice the State.
The court rejected the argument of the Appellate Division
that the interpretation of the word "person" in § 288 is necessarily
controlled by previous constructions of the word "party" in the
same section. Formerly municipal corporations, though parties
to an action, were not subject to examination before trial.' To
overcome this immunity, C.P.A. § 2 92-a was enacted in 1941, authorizing deposition of a public corporation through its officers,
where it is a party to an action or the original owner of a claim.
By analogy, the Appellate Division felt that authority for the pretrial examination of a state officer as a witness must come from
the Legislature. The Court of Appeals, however, maintained that
the general trend for greater liberalization,4 coupled with the duty
of every citizen to testify, allows this deposition to be taken.
2. U. S. v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, No. 14,692d (C.C.D. Va. 1807).

8

WIGMORE,

EvinExcE, §§ 2369, 2370 (3d ed., 1940).
3. Davidson v. City of New York, 221 N. Y. 487,
N. E. 1042 (1917); Bush
Term. Co. v. City of New York, 259 N. Y. 509, 182 N. E.116
158 (1932); Rucker v. Board
of Ed. of City of New York, 284 N. Y. 346, 31 N. E. 2d 186 (1940).
4. See Saxe, Civil Remedies and Procedure,27 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1201
(1952).

